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AbsTrACT
Addiction science and public policy have for some time 
been articulated in conformity with a broader antinomy 
in Western thought between biological reductionism 
and liberal voluntarism. Hence, mainstream debates 
have concerned whether and how addiction might be 
understood as a disease in the biomedically orthodox 
sense of anatomical or physiological pathology or 
whether and how addiction might be understood as 
a voluntary choice of some kind. The fact that those 
who staff these debates have appeared either unable 
or unwilling to consider alternatives to this antinomy 
has resulted in a rather unhappy and intransigent set 
of intellectual anomalies both on the biomedical and 
the social scientific sides of this divide. Perhaps more 
importantly, it has also resulted in a striking isolation 
of scientific debates themselves from the vicissitudes 
of therapeutically caring for those putatively suffering 
from addictions both within and outside clinical settings. 
After briefly demonstrating the conformity of debates in 
addiction science with the broader antinomy between 
biological reductionism and liberal voluntarism and the 
anomalies that thereby result, this article considers the 
scientific and therapeutic benefits of a psychosomatic 
framework for the understanding of both self-governing 
subjects and the experience of a loss of self-control to 
agencies of addiction.
Addiction science and public policy have for some 
time been articulated largely in conformity with a 
broader antinomy in Western thought between biome-
chanicali reductionism and liberal voluntarism. Hence, 
mainstream debates have concerned whether and 
how addiction might be understood as a disease in the 
biomedically orthodox sense of anatomical or phys-
iological pathology or whether and how addiction 
might be understood as a voluntary choice of some 
kind.1–3 The fact that those who staff these debates 
have appeared either unable or unwilling to consider 
alternatives to this antinomy has resulted in a rather 
unhappy and intransigent set of intellectual anomalies 
both on the medical and the social scientific sides of 
this divide. In this article I focus primarily on their 
failure to provide adequately for the agency of addic-
tions in contrast to the agency of those who suffer 
i The term biomechanical is used here to highlight 
the contrast between biological and voluntaristic 
theories of addiction. Whereas biology subscribes 
to a natural scientific conception of the world as 
invariably governed by natural laws and/or mech-
anisms, voluntaristic theories like those found in 
economics and other social sciences subscribe to 
the view that human choices are not predetermined 
by, or reducible to, natural laws or mechanisms but 
rather are in some sense freely adopted.
from them. Perhaps more important than its intellec-
tual failings, this antinomy has also resulted in a rather 
striking isolation of scientific debates themselves from 
the vicissitudes of therapeutically caring for those puta-
tively suffering from addictions both in and outside 
clinical settings. After briefly demonstrating the long-
time conformity of mainstream debates in addiction 
science with the broader dichotomy between biolog-
ical reductionism and liberal voluntarism and the 
anomalies that thereby result, the article considers the 
scientific and therapeutic benefits that follow from 
the adoption of a psychosomatic framework for the 
understanding of both free agency, or self-governing 
subjects, and the experience of a loss of self-control to 
agencies of addiction.
The definition and purview of psychosomatics is 
and has been variously formulated perhaps for as long 
as the term has been in use. My objective in this article, 
then, is not to decisively establish what psychosomatics 
is and then apply its principles to our understanding 
of free agency and the agency of addiction. Rather, I 
draw eclectically from authors who have articulated 
positions in keeping with the enduring psychosomatic 
impatience with dualisms between minds as sentient 
and purposeful moral agents and bodies as indifferent 
and amoral machines. Relatedly, I draw on critiques of 
mind/body dualists’ widespread tendency to posit both 
minds and bodies as categorically distinct from one 
another and as invariably singular, integrated systems, 
the nature of which can be understood independently 
of the particular sociohistorical environments within 
which they emerge and are sustained. In so doing, I 
show how these broadly psychosomatic insights allow 
us to better understand the difference between free 
agency and the agency of addiction. And, more impor-
tantly, they allow us to more effectively both warrant 
and facilitate therapeutic care for people suffering 
from addictions.
AddiCTion As mediCAl diseAse
Since the earliest days of its medicalisation, addic-
tion has been typically characterised as in some 
sense a biological affliction of the will.4–10 In the 
first decade of the 19th century, Benjamin Rush’s 
pamphlet, An Inquiry into the Effects of Ardent 
Spirits Upon the Human Body and Mind, asserted 
that habitual drunkenness is indeed a medical 
disease.11ii And in Medical Inquiries and Obser-
vations upon Diseases of the Mind, Rush wrote, 
‘The use of strong drink is at first the effect of free 
agency. From habit it takes place from necessity’.12 
ii Earlier editions of this pamphlet, first published 
in 1784 as An Inquiry into the Effects of Spirituous 
Liquors on the Human Body, made no reference to 
habitual drunkenness as itself a disease but confined 
attention to its role in causing other diseases.
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It was on this basis that in his landmark study ‘The Discovery of 
Addiction’, Levine4 held that Rush’s writings marked a water-
shed where earlier religious orientations to habitual drunkenness 
as a sinful free choice were overtaken by a medical one stressing 
a supplanting of the addict’s ‘free agency’ by a pathological 
condition.
While the specifics of Rush’s writings on addiction have 
not survived the test of time, it has remained a core objective 
of addiction medicine to distinguish the agency of addictions 
from the otherwise ‘free agency’ of those who suffer from them. 
Most prominent among the motivations driving this core objec-
tive has been a desire to mitigate the blaming of addicts for 
the moral failures linked to their addictive behaviours.13 14 In 
many versions of this perspective, the agency of addiction has 
been located in the objects of addiction themselves. Hence, for 
example, even today one often reads of the intrinsically addic-
tive powers of drugs like alcohol, heroin, cocaine, nicotine or 
fentanyl. Although widely accepted as an article of common 
sense both among health professionals and the public alike, 
the preponderance of scientific evidence runs counter to these 
theories. The difficulty with locating the agency of addiction in 
the objects of addiction themselves has been that these objects 
appear to be addictive to only a small minority of those exposed 
to them. Epidemiological studies routinely show that most of 
those who ingest the so-called addictive substances never fall 
into harmful patterns of use, let alone lose control.3 15 Accord-
ingly, mainstream addiction medicine has sought to locate the 
agency of addiction through anatomical and physiological inves-
tigations of the bodies of those presumed afflicted. This said, 
there has nonetheless persisted, even among biomedical experts, 
a curiously obstinate tendency to blame addicts for their condi-
tion. As will be seen, this tendency to blur the line between the 
medical and moral gaze, while perhaps mysterious by the lights 
of an orthodox biomechanical reductionism, is easily explained 
from a psychosomatic perspective.
Thought they cannot be said to have captured the imagina-
tions of most mainstream medical doctors, the 19th century saw 
a fairly diverse proliferation of medical theories of addiction. 
Most drifted from a direct concern with the biological agency 
or agencies compelling involuntary drug consumption to topics 
like delirium tremens and other acute effects of alcohol in the 
body, topics of little relevance to the clinical management of 
self-destructive drug habits but more easily brought to heel by 
the experimental and conceptual resources available to medical 
science. Among the most influential 19th-century theories were 
degeneracy and neurasthenia. Following the French psychiatrist 
Benedict Augustin Morel, many attributed addictions to degen-
erate hereditary predispositions. While fundamentally physical 
in nature, these predispositions were said to compromise moral 
and mental fitness, rendering those afflicted permanently prone 
to addiction. The theory of neurasthenia, promoted most prom-
inently by the American neurologist Charles Miller Beard, held 
that modern civilisation neurologically overstimulated those of 
more refined sensibilities. This, in turn, rendered them vulner-
able to a range of infirmities including addiction. Similar to 
degeneracy theory, neurasthenia located the agency of addiction 
in the addict’s compromised biological constitution. But unlike 
the therapeutic pessimism of degeneracy theory, the theory of 
neurasthenia, by also pathologising modern civilisation, offered 
a therapeutic path forward in a period of regenerative asylum 
from the putative turmoil of urban industrial society. What must 
be noted in both cases, however, is their failure to distinguish 
addicts’ free agency from the agency of their addiction. While 
biologically compromised and socially transgressive, it was not 
at all clear how the degenerate or neurasthenic could be held to 
have genuinely lost their free agency rather than merely exer-
cising it deficiently.
As the 19th century came to a close, the public debate on 
addiction turned decidedly away from reforming or caring 
for those with addictions and towards prohibition. Addiction 
science, to the extent it survived, was engulfed by this more 
general cultural trend and was largely subordinated to criminal 
justice agendas. Accordingly, putative addicts were increasingly 
cast as incorrigible psychopaths or deranged skid row derelicts 
(in either case beyond hope of therapeutic reform) and, as was 
the case with degeneracy theory, their free agency was rendered 
indistinguishable from the agency of their addiction. As psycho-
dynamic psychiatry gradually fell from favour in the medical 
community and public disenchantment with strictly criminal 
controls grew more pervasive, addiction medicine was increas-
ingly drawn to focus on the development of drug tolerance and 
physiological withdrawal symptoms.16–18 By these lights, addicts 
were no longer seen as intrinsically inferior beings but, rather, 
physiologically ‘hooked’ or ‘dependent’ on drugs and compelled 
to stave off withdrawal through continued use. Although, in 
contrast to degeneracy and psychopathy, dependency theories 
did not disparage the addict’s inherent rationality, it remains 
far from clear how withdrawal symptoms might be held to 
somehow displace the free agency of those who experience them 
rather than just changing and narrowing people’s priorities. 
Mere dedication to the avoidance of withdrawal symptoms is a 
rather dubious stand-in for a genuine loss of one’s free agency. 
Moreover, drugs like cocaine and nicotine and activities like sex, 
gambling, shopping, internet use and eating appear capable of 
arousing addictions as self-destructive as those involving alcohol 
and opiates without producing physiological withdrawal symp-
toms at all.
It is in part due to the accumulation of such anomalies along 
with new techniques of neurological investigation that over the 
last three decades interest has turned to the most recent para-
digm in biomedical addiction science, the brain disease model of 
addiction.19–21 The brain disease literature accounts for what is 
often called the ‘hijacking’ of our free agency by the agency of 
addiction in two main ways. First, according to incentive sensi-
tisation theory, the intensity of addicts’ desire (want) for drugs 
is neurologically separated from the pleasure they derive from 
(like) drugs, seeming therefore to make the desire irrational and, 
by implication, unfree.22 But wanting something more than one 
likes it does not logically entail a displacement of free agency 
nor do people necessarily experience it as such—consider, for 
example, wants like exercise and a healthy diet. While we may 
want these things, it does not follow that if we do not like them 
as much as we want them we have therefore lost control of 
ourselves. Hence, like withdrawal theories, incentive sensitisa-
tion theory conspicuously fails to specify an agency of addiction 
that is distinguishable from addicts’ otherwise free agency.
The second way brain disease theorists argue that addictions 
displace people’s free agency is by compromising the brain’s 
so-called executive functions.23 These functions cover things like 
attention, response inhibition, planning, problem solving and 
working memory. But insofar as they systematically ignore the 
actual, real-world, preferences of particular people, this research 
strays rather far from the lived realities and experiences of free 
agency and its loss in the real world. To claim that in real life 
people uniformly equate free choices with executive functions 
like long-term planning, problem solving and impulse control 
is empirically false. Not only do we freely throw caution to the 
wind on occasion but so too on occasion do we link our free 
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choices with our gut instincts, spontaneous sensibilities or predi-
lections, and indeed equate the kinds of activities associated 
with executive function with alienation from our real selves and 
authentic free agency.24–26 Indeed precisely because they hope 
to empower addicts by re-establishing their authentic sense of 
themselves, addiction rehabilitation programmes routinely place 
extensive therapeutic emphasis not on teaching people to exec-
utively inhibit their spontaneous sensibilities but on ‘getting in 
touch’ with them through their free and open expression.iii
In this brief summary of the history of addiction medicine, 
I have shown some of the main ways in which addiction has 
been construed in biomedical terms that despite their propo-
nents’ best efforts to do so nonetheless fail to either provide 
adequately for the epidemiological and clinical facts or for the 
agency of addiction specifically as something that compromises 
addicts’ otherwise free agency. These failures have served to 
rather considerably distance biomedical addiction science from 
the lived experiences of addicts themselves and, relatedly, to 
seriously diminish the utility of biomedical addiction science to 
those who seek to clinically, or otherwise therapeutically, care 
for those suffering from addictions.20 In the next section I show 
how those who reject the disease model and seek instead to 
cast addictions as non-pathological, although self-destructive, 
patterns of free choice have also strayed rather considerably 
from the lived experiences of addicts and thereby compromised 
their own capacities to inform the work of therapeutic carers.
AddiCTion As ChoiCe
The medicalisation of addiction and its purported exoneration 
of putative addicts from moral responsibility has always been 
contested, often fiercely so.27–29 Indeed the idea that addicts 
never in fact lose their free agency remains widespread in both 
the social sciences and popular culture. Dating at least as far 
back as John Stuart Mill’s essay ‘On Liberty’,30 this position 
has been based in large part on the normative propositions that 
all people are naturally endowed with the faculty of self-gov-
ernment and that it is unjust to suppress their free exercise 
thereof.31 32 Perhaps ironically, these normative propositions 
have become widely entrenched in the social sciences via osten-
sibly value-neutral postures of agnosticism towards elite and/or 
mainstream norms disparaging historically marginalised and/or 
vilified groups and a concomitant emphasis of their local ratio-
nality and legitimacy.33–35 This has been part of a more general 
social scientific tendency to understand social reality as invari-
ably composed of the consensual or conflictual interactions of a 
diversity of integrated social groups and to define their members 
as integrated individuals—rational, self-governing agents who 
affiliate with these groups based on their belief in the group’s 
distinctive traditions, interests or values.
Hence, more specifically, by the mid-20th century putative 
addicts were routinely understood as members of subcultures 
with their own distinctive value systems rather than sufferers of 
intrinsic personal afflictions or deficits of any kind. Concerned 
iii This tendency to equate free agency with response inhibition or 
impulse control and the loss of free agency with a submission to 
one’s impulses is not confined to the brain disease model but can 
also be seen elsewhere as in the disinhibition literature68 69 and 
the literature on ‘ego-depletion’.70 But there are no compelling 
theoretical or empirical reasons to generically, or universally, 
equate disinhibition with a loss of free agency either. People 
often very deliberately use alcohol or drugs to reduce their inhi-
bitions without feeling, or inviting the accusation, that they have 
in any way forsaken their free agency or self-control.
to avoid slipping from their presumed value neutrality into an 
illiberally biased moralism, social researchers have often over-
looked the fact that addiction, understood specifically as a loss 
of self-control, is an idea putative addicts often themselves 
take seriously and which is not necessarily coercively imposed 
from without. Moreover, the comparatively few social scientific 
studies that do treat addiction as a cause of personal suffering 
tend to render it in ways that do not jibe well with much of 
the available evidence.36 37 In short, social scientific studies have 
heavily tended to hold that addiction reflects a notorious but 
nonetheless conscious, deliberate, self-governed and, hence, 
voluntary choice to value the use of drugs over matters that 
others in society consider more important.38
Since roughly the 1980s, a growing collection of self-described 
‘choice theorists’ in economics, social psychology, philosophy 
and even neuroscience itself has sought to more rigorously 
and methodically develop this position. These theorists tend to 
begin with the observation that most behaviours attributed to 
addictions are ‘incentive sensitive’ (at least partially consistent 
with cost–benefit analysis) and not compulsive in the orthodox 
neurological sense emphasised by disease theorists. While this is 
true, we should be careful not to make too much of it. Plants are 
incentive-sensitive in the sense that they grow towards resources 
like light and water, but we would not normally want to concep-
tualise this as a voluntary choice.
Most credit Becker and Murphy39 with launching this new 
line of research with their argument that addictions reflect delib-
erate choices made in full knowledge of their future costs and 
benefits and that addicts’ preferences remain stable over time. 
Orphanides and Zervos40 criticised Becker and Murphy39 for 
casting addicts as without regret and, because they are already 
fully cognizant of the future costs and benefits of their choices, 
unentitled to (and without need for) therapeutic help. Orpha-
nides and Zervos40 introduced the possibility of learning, regret 
and inadvertently falling into addiction, but did so by merely 
insisting on the addict’s initial ignorance rather than considering 
the possibility that their preferences may in fact be incoherent 
or unstable. While hypothetically providing for its onset, their 
argument fails to provide for people’s ongoing struggles with 
addiction or the fundamental warrant for, or logic of, specifically 
therapeutic interventions.
Most choice theorists have abandoned the effort to explain 
addiction by the lights of orthodox rational choice theory.1 For 
example, George Ainslie, and others, have influentially argued 
addicts are prone to prefer present to future rewards and to 
‘hyperbolically discount’ the prospects of future costs and bene-
fits.2 19 41 42 They thereby reject the postulate that people are 
fully future-oriented cost–benefit analysts in the sense demanded 
by orthodox rational choice theorists. The greater the expecta-
tion of immediate reward and the greater the expected intensity 
of that reward, the more we become vulnerable to temptations 
to abandon our longer term plans and preferences. While these 
kinds of modifications have increased the credibility of choice 
theoretic arguments, even modified arguments often remain 
tenuously grounded in empirical data and have been criticised 
for merely providing formal descriptions of idealised narratives 
of addiction rather than explaining actual empirical instances of 
it.43 Moreover, by closing the distance between addiction and 
generic features of human choice making, like our ubiquitous 
tendencies to hyperbolically discount future costs and bene-
fits choice, theorists tend towards a normalisation of addictive 
reasoning and volition. This makes it difficult to see why or how 
addiction should warrant suspension of our default practices of 
holding ourselves and one another morally accountable for our 
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actions in favour of a more therapeutic, sympathetic and excul-
patory stance.
Therapeutic work does not in the first instance require theo-
ries that serve only to plausibly explain or justify putatively 
addicted behaviour; it specifically requires theories that allow 
these behaviours to be plausibly disowned. It is only by plau-
sibly distinguishing the free agency of addicts from the effects 
of their addictions that people might be simultaneously under-
stood as amenable to therapeutic empowerment or emancipa-
tion from their addictions and somehow also afflicted by an 
agency of addiction that justifies and demands such a therapeutic 
engagement in the first place. Furthermore, those struggling to 
overcome addictions require theories that go beyond merely 
providing credible justification for absolution, or the disowning 
of past misdeeds. As all who have sought to care for addicts 
know, recovery is an essentially ongoing exercise of learning to 
anticipate and prevent the rekindling of people’s addictions, and 
it requires theories that not only facilitate, but actually warrant, 
such a project in the first place.44
Choice theorists have made little, if any, headway in this 
regard. Pickard,45 for example, offers the enticing possibility 
of holding addicts responsible for overcoming their addictions 
but not blaming them for their addictions. But this turns out 
to be a distinction not between addicts’ responsible free agency 
(which it is the work of therapy to empower) and the agency 
of their addictions (which might be suppressed and blamed for 
anticipated relapses). It is a distinction between ‘detached’ and 
‘affective’ blame. Detached blame is retained as both a basis for 
demanding behavioural change and for negatively sanctioning 
problematic behaviour. We must renounce only affectively 
infused spite in response to what Pickard45 calls the addict’s 
‘disorder of choice’. Conspicuously missing from her account 
are (1) a warrant for the claim that addicts are emancipated 
rather than merely domesticated by the changes ‘therapeuti-
cally’ imposed on them through negative sanctioning, and (2) a 
warrant for viewing addicted choices as somehow ‘disordered’ 
rather than just blameworthy—that is, a warrant for therapy 
over criminal corrections or civil retribution. The British crim-
inal justice system certainly blames criminals and is not primarily 
concerned to therapeutically care for them. But it does nonethe-
less seek to appear dispassionate in its dispensation of justice. 
Or in Pickard’s45 language, to favour ‘detached’ over ‘affective’ 
blame, just deserts over lynch mobs.
Similarly, while vigorously and masterfully critiquing brain 
disease models for mistaking neurological markers of normal 
learning as markers of pathological brain damage,iv Lewis46 47 
repeatedly backslides from his addiction-reflects-normal-rath-
er-than-pathological-learning-processes thesis into statements 
that addictive learning neurologically ‘distorts’ cognitive func-
tioning. This lapse into usage of the negatively value-laden term 
‘distort’ with its implications of disfigurement and perversion 
is plainly driven by a desire to provide warrant for therapeutic 
as opposed to coercive interventions. But he offers no explana-
tion for why addiction should be understood as a ‘distortion’ of 
normal learning. Having denied himself access to the medical 
mantle of disease, Lewis46 47 cannot reconcile his belief that 
addicts should be cared for and not blamed with his belief that 
addictions are nonetheless patterns of choice and products of 
the positively value-laden term ‘learning’ with its implications 
of personal growth, skills or knowledge acquisition. In sum, 
iv Lewis routinely equates the neurology of negatively valued drug 
addictions with positively valued preoccupations with things 
like romantic relationships, sports and summer holidays.71
addiction science and policy remains to this day torn between 
the Scylla of a biomechanical reductionism that cannot provide 
for the richly layered nuances of personal freedom as it is exhib-
ited in contemporary societies and the Charybdis of a liberal 
voluntarism that axiomatically forecloses on explaining the lived 
experiences of unfreedom that appear to sometimes flow from 
intrapersonal clashes among what Mills48 called our myriad 
‘tastes and pursuits’.
PsyChosomATiC subjeCTs And The AgenCies of 
AddiCTion
The definition and purview of psychosomatics is and has been 
variously formulated perhaps for as long as the term has been 
in use.49 My objective in this section, then, is not to decisively 
establish what psychosomatics is and then apply its principles to 
our understanding of free agency and the agency of addiction. 
Rather, I draw eclectically from authors who have articulated 
positions in keeping with the enduring psychosomatic impa-
tience with dualisms between minds as sentient and purposeful 
moral agents and bodies as indifferent and amoral machines.50 
Relatedly, I draw on critiques of mind/body dualists’ widespread 
tendency to posit both minds and bodies as distinct from one 
another and as invariably singular, integrated systems, the nature 
of which can be understood independently of the particular 
sociohistorical environments within which they emerge and are 
sustained. In so doing, I show how these broadly psychosomatic 
insights allow us to better understand the difference between 
free agency and the agency of addiction. And, perhaps more 
importantly, effectively both warrant and facilitate therapeutic 
care for people suffering from addictions.
Here is not the place to rehearse the diverse critiques that have 
been lodged against Cartesian dualism. From Marx, to Amer-
ican pragmatism, to Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and existential 
phenomenology, a growing collection of researchers have argued 
respectively for an embodied understanding of our minds’ activ-
ities and mindful understanding of our bodies’ activities. In a 
particularly incisive study of the ‘odour kits’, perfume makers use 
to train ‘noses’ to detect progressively subtler aromatic contrasts, 
Latour51 makes a strong empirical case for such a psychosomatic 
subjectivity. In this study Latour51 demonstrates the body is 
not just an objective biomechanical system about which we can 
subjectively learn but, fundamentally, a mutable medium literally 
‘articulated’ through its ‘learn[ing] to be affected’. Latour51 goes a 
considerable distance towards creating a conceptual space within 
which addiction might be construed as an acquired but none-
theless eminently embodied form of subjectivity. By retaining 
a focus on the subjective, or lived sentient, body he accommo-
dates much of what choice theorists seek to achieve by empha-
sising incentive sensitivity, neuroplasticity and by narrowing the 
distance between addiction and normal learning processes. But 
although he speaks of the multiplicity of environments within 
which the body subjectively learns to be affected, Latour51 does 
not address the multiplicity of the body itself—as not just an 
articulated medium for learning to be affected but a linked set of 
media for doing so. This limits his sensitivity to the potentials for 
embodied conflicts and/or afflictions like addiction.
The tendency to think of subjectivities, minds and/or bodies 
as singular and unified is also hegemonic throughout the main-
stream addiction science literature on both the disease and choice 
sides of the debates. However, research in neurology, psychology 
and sociology is itself now beginning to discover the reality of 
disunity. For example, Lewis has written in this regard that habit 
learning originates piecemeal in setting specific kinds of ways 
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but that eventually, because brains tend to conserve structure and 
resources, habits, or acquired ‘synaptic networks,’ often converge 
and become mutually reinforcing. Crucially, however, he notes 
these processes need not converge on a wholly unified subject, or 
fully integrated hub for all experience, deliberation and volition. 
Instead, ‘alternative synaptic networks can compete with each 
other…this is the case when addiction arises in development, 
but also when it dissipates, replaced by the desire for and belief 
in alternative outcomes’.52 What Lewis fails to fully appreciate, 
however, and what prevents him from reconciling his incisive 
understanding of the neurology of addiction with his hope to 
produce a warrant for therapeutic care is the labile and dynamic 
relationships that occur between the diverse psychosomatically 
embodied subjectivities he describes as the neuroplastic synaptic 
networks that comprise our biomechanical brains on the one 
hand, and on the other hand our selves specifically as morally 
accountable subjects.
Lewis,19 like most addiction scientists, argues that addiction 
is a constellation of habits that grow from the repeated pursuit 
of something highly desired. But his distinctive emphasis on 
neuroplasticity and the disunity of our synaptic networks opens 
an unprecedented path towards a more psychosomatic under-
standing of both free agency and the agency of addiction. While 
he acknowledges a deep intellectual debt to Kent Berridge,53 
who has argued that some substances and/or experiences are 
naturally or intrinsically desirable given the neurological hard-
wiring of our brains, Lewis never himself explicitly adopts this 
view and is, as noted, much more likely to highlight neuroplas-
ticity and neurodiversity than hardwired universal dispositions. 
Unlike most neurologists, then, his work is consistent with the 
phenomenological fact that not all people enjoy drug-induced 
experiences. It is also consistent with the fact that particular 
people may enjoy these experiences under some circumstances 
and wholly detest them under other circumstances (an example 
I often give with students is to contrast the experience of 
being drunk at a party to the experience of being drunk in a 
final exam). These facts combined with Lewis’ insights into the 
neuroplastic and neurodiverse causes of desire strongly support 
a view of the body as host to psychosomatically diverse desiring 
subjectivities. And, conversely, they also cast considerable doubt 
on the prospects of ever fully reducing subjective and particular 
experiences of pleasure, pleasure seeking, pain or pain avoidance 
to the generic functions or dysfunctions of generic neurological 
structures. However, an intriguing and promising compliment to 
research on the neuroplastic and neurodiverse origins of desire 
can be found in the traditions of psychoanalytic and phenome-
nological thought that have sought to develop non-reductionist 
and more dynamic understandings of the human libido.
 
Merleau-Ponty,54 for example, writes:
For Freud himself, the sexual is not the genital, sexual life is not a 
mere effect of the processes having their seat in the genital organs, 
libido is not an instinct, that is, an activity naturally directed towards 
definitive ends, it is the general power, which the psychosomatic sub-
ject enjoys, of taking root in different settings, of establishing himself 
[sic] through different experiences, of gaining structures of conduct.
Here Merleau-Ponty54 suggests a radical departure from a 
view of the psychosomatic subject as a unified desiring agent 
and poses the possibility of conceiving pleasures and desires 
as being diversely forged ‘in different settings’. A critic of the 
transcendental ambitions of phenomenologists like Husserl, 
Merleau-Ponty54 casts the first-person experience of the lived 
body, including its pleasures and desires, as always an occa-
sioned, situated and provisional affair rather than a neuro-
logical, psychoanalytic or phenomenological fait accompli. 
Similarly, while casting our experiences of the lived body as 
inherently diverse, elusive and ambiguous, he studiously avoids 
invoking an unconscious mind comparatively insulated from the 
body or the myriad practical conditions within which we find 
ourselves. Instead, Merleau-Ponty54 takes a more praxiological 
stance, holding that conscious experience is always shaped by 
the various ways we are practically engaged with and immersed 
in worlds at a preconscious or habitual level. Embodied, precon-
scious or habitual coping, then, is prior to conscious interpre-
tation—or, indeed, the conscious identification of any ‘thing’, 
including our own ‘self ’.
These ideas, including that of a praxiologically disaggregated 
libido, directly influenced Bourdieu55 in his formulations of the 
habitus. However, like Latour’s model of bodily articulation, 
Bourdieu56 also sometimes casts the habitus as a unified set of 
dispositions or ‘unifying principle which retranslates the intrinsic 
and relational characteristics of a position into a unitary lifestyle, 
that is, a unitary set of choices, persons, goods and practices. 
This said, very good reasons can be found both in Bourdieu’s 
own work and elsewhere to suggest a more fragmented or plural-
ised habitus,57 one that allows comparatively greater emphasis 
on the relationships between particular praxiological fields and 
the respective habitus forged therein rather than the develop-
mental sedimentation emphasised in his more unitary accounts. 
For example, Bourdieu’s protégé, Loic Wacquant,58 writes in this 
regard:
habitus is not necessarily coherent and unified. Rather, it displays 
varying degrees of integration and tension, depending on the char-
acter and compatibility of the social situations that fashioned it over 
time. A sequence of congruent institutions and stable microcosms will 
tend to fashion a cohesive habitus whose successive layers reinforce 
one another and work in unison. Dissimilar organizations anchored 
by divergent values or entropic universes, by contrast, cultivate un-
stable systems of dispositions divided against themselves and wont to 
generate irregular and inconsistent lines of action.
This suggests an image of psychosomatic subjects as to varying 
degrees either integrated or disintegrated depending on the 
empirical conditions under which they have been fashioned. 
Wacquant’s58 invocation of ‘unstable systems of dispositions 
divided against themselves and wont to generate irregular and 
inconsistent lines of action’ will no doubt ring a bell for students 
of addiction. The fact that these dispositions are understood as 
acquired but preconscious or habitual is also deeply resonant 
with what we know empirically about addictions. But the most 
potentially groundbreaking advantage of this approach is its 
positing of what might be called an ecologicalv axis for consid-
ering how systems of dispositions might become divided against 
themselves. This ecological emphasis better accounts than does 
v The term ‘ecological’ is used here for two reasons. First, it 
connotes the materiality of an environment more than do terms 
like ‘culture’, ‘context’ or ‘social space’, which are sometimes 
held to refer only to ‘webs of significance’ or symbolic envi-
ronments.72 Second, and more importantly, the term ‘ecology’ 
indicates a reciprocal relation between agent and environment 
without presuming the humanity of the agent in question. Insofar 
as I am distinguishing agencies of addiction from the human 
agents said to suffer from them, it is useful to avoid anthropo-
morphic terms when describing the environments within which 
addictions are held to be forged, kindled and rekindled.
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ascendant addiction science for the widespread observation 
that most addicts ‘mature out’ of addiction as their life circum-
stances change.59 It also better provides for Robins’60 findings of 
minimal relapse to heroin use among returning Vietnam veterans; 
Waldorf ’s61 and Biernacki62 findings of a commonly experienced 
association of recovery from addiction with removal from the 
types of settings and associates that had constituted one’s prac-
tical contexts of drug use; and the widely recognised recovery 
advantage had by addicts with comparatively wider ranges of 
coping skills and what Waldorf et al63 call a ‘stake in conven-
tional life’. These studies strongly suggest addiction is often a 
more or less context-specific form of bodily articulation and 
that the experience of a loss of self-control is caused not only 
by the biomechanical relationship between user and drug but by 
conflicts among the various ecologies, the specific constellations 
of practical and relational contexts, one has come to inhabit and 
within which one feels compelled to live.
Still more importantly, pertaining to the warrant and facil-
itation of therapeutic care for addicts, this approach valuably 
augments what is now a virtually unrivalled understanding of the 
instability of addicts’ dispositions to act in terms of a temporal 
contrast between short-term and long-term preferences.2 19 64 
Despite their earnest hopes to encourage compassion and ther-
apeutic care, the steadfast, almost myopic, focus of addiction 
scientists on temporal mechanisms of preference instability like 
incentive sensitisation and hyperbolic discounting inevitably 
results in images of addicts as impulsive, hedonistic, short-
sighted, undisciplined and incapable of deferring gratification. 
Weighed down by images like these, it is very difficult to counter 
the ubiquitous tendency both among healthcare professionals 
and the wider public to blame addicts for their fates.
The approach proposed here allows for an entirely different 
take on addicts’ unstable dispositions—one that posits a clash of 
ecologically grounded psychosomatic subjectivities rather than 
a clash of short-term and long-term preferences. While we are 
all prone to greater and lesser degrees of psychosomatic integra-
tion depending on the extent to which we have been shaped by 
what Wacquant above calls ‘[d]issimilar organizations anchored 
by divergent values or entropic universes’, the failure of integra-
tion can sometimes become so extreme as to precipitate a radical 
disowning of particular psychosomatic subjectivities—a radical 
personal and moral divestment from those subjectivities that 
effectively divorces certain constellations of entrenched habit 
from our own or our significant others’ sense of who we really 
are—that is, the agency of our addictions from our free agency 
specifically as self-discovering, self-actualising and self-governing 
moral subjects.
ConCluding remArks
Neither performance-enhancing nor dysfunctional drug use can 
be adequately understood in artificial isolation from the specific 
assemblages of ecological—practical and relational—contexts 
within which pleasure and pain, personal ease and dis-ease, 
competent and incompetent performance, receive their genuine 
measure.65–67 As argued above, the body is not a singular psycho-
somatic medium through which we learn to be affected, but a 
complex constellation of such media each shaped in the first 
instance by the various ecological environments within which we 
learn to effectively and affectively conduct our lives. The assorted 
articulations of our bodies having learnt to be affected will inev-
itably differ in the extent to which they are deemed productive 
or satisfying, unproductive or unsatisfying by ourselves and 
those with whom we share our lives. These assessments will 
largely dictate whether, and the comparative extent to which, 
we self-identify with our body’s different articulations and the 
comparative extent to which our significant others identify us 
with some rather than others.
Seen in this light, the status of addiction as a form of disease 
need not be decided with rigid reference to whether suffering 
can be decisively linked to isolated dysfunctional biological 
mechanisms, but, more generally, with reference to any number 
of different patterns of seemingly harmful, alienating and 
intransigent bodily articulation. That is, patterns of ecologically 
grounded psychosomatic subjectivity with which we cannot, or 
do not want to, identify our selves precisely because they appear 
to afflict or endanger those of our psychosomatic subjectivities 
with which we do self-identify. This understanding of the rela-
tionship between free agency and the agencies of addiction also 
illuminates better than does received addiction science why and 
how interventions like 12-step groups and therapeutic commu-
nities of various stripes have been so comparatively attractive to 
those seeking therapeutic help with their addictions and to those 
predisposed to provide such help. In contrast to other forms of 
therapeutic care, these kinds of interventions seek to emphasise 
the provision of immersive ecological alternatives to the spaces 
within which people’s addictions were forged, and within which 
they might continue to be kindled and rekindled. They are, in 
other words, comparatively better keyed to the linkage of our 
various psychosomatic subjectivities to the various ecological 
spaces within which they are acquired and sustained and within 
which we also evaluate their compatibility with our specific 
projects of self-discovery and ongoing self-actualisation. Rather 
than focus, as most addiction science has, on therapeutic tech-
niques for fostering people’s commitment to longer term over 
shorter term cost–benefit calculations, ecologically grounded 
interventions direct considerably more attention to the details 
of the worlds within which our particular efforts to self-actu-
alise (in both the shorter and the longer term) are most and least 
likely to be stabilised and to thrive.
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